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T

HE United States Supreme Court promulgated the 1983

amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure out of
growing concern about abuse of the civil litigation process. The
most controversial aspect of the implementation of these revisions has been judicial enforcement of amended Rule 11 (the
Rule) in ways that disadvantage or "chill"' civil rights plaintiffs
and attorneys. 2 As the federal judiciary enters its eighth year of
implementing the Rule, courts apparently have improved their
application of it by becoming more solicitous of the needs of civil
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank George
Cochran, Barry Nakell, Peggy Hesse and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions,
the Harris Trust for continuing generous support, and Cecelia Palmer and Beverly Stevenson for processing this piece.
1. "Chilling effects" are inappropriate effects that discourage possibly legitimate lawsuits. The effects are attributable to various factors including the
Rule's overly vigorous enforcement, resource restraints on civil rights plaintiffs,
and the non-traditional nature of civil rights litigation. Civil rights litigation
consists of lawsuits to enforce values and commands involving civil rights in the
Constitution and such civil rights legislation as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The deficient
resources of many civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys make them risk averse and
particularly susceptible to being chilled. For an examination of these concepts,
see Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 485, 495-98
(1988-89).
2. Rule 11 (the Rule) requires that judges sanction attorneys and litigants
who fail to conduct reasonable prefiling inquiries. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. These
sanctions are the focus of this article. The Rule also prohibits papers interposed
for inappropriate purposes. Because relatively few judges have employed that
provision and it has less potential for chilling legitimate lawsuits, it will not be
treated here.

(105)
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rights plaintiffs and their counsel, in recognition of the important
social function that civil rights litigation fulfills in combatting
discrimination.
The first section of this article briefly examines the Rule's
early implementation and the disadvantages that enforcement
had for civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys. The second section
analyzes recent developments suggesting that judicial application
of the Rule has improved. Precisely how widespread such enforcement actually has been or will become is unclear. These
complications prevent definitive conclusions about whether the
improved application will suffice for civil rights plaintiffs. Given
the present uncertainty, the third section of this article provides
suggestions for the future. It proposes that the Supreme Court,
the Advisory Committee and Congress expeditiously amend the
Rule and offers suggestions for judicial enforcement until the
3
Rule is revised.
I.

EARLY PROBLEMATIC APPLICATION OF RULE 11

Implementation of the Rule disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs and their counsel for at least five years following the August
1983 revision. 4 Considerable data, gleaned primarily from pub5
lished opinions issued before 1989, support this observation.
3. The recent flurry of Rule 11 activity and the importance of what is at
stake in the amendment's application-vindication of fundamental civil rightswarrant additional examination. Cf. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil
Procedure. The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1925 (1989) (author
who suffered steady diet of Rule 11 for more than year as Reporter of Third
Circuit Task Force on Rule 11 "felt like a character in La Grande Bouffe, a movie
in which people literally eat themselves to death"). The Advisory Committee
has undertaken a study that may lead to proposals for change. See infra note 91
and accompanying text.
4. The early effects of the Rule's implementation have been documented
elsewhere. In this section I rely most on Tobias, Reassessing Rule II and Civil
Rights Cases, 33 How. L.J. 161 (1990); Tobias, supra note 1, at 490-507; Vairo,
Rule 11: A CriticalAnalysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988). The early judicial application
of the Rule does not warrant extensive treatment in this article, because numerous courts and commentators have already examined this enforcement and
found it to be problematic for both civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys. See, e.g.,
Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1085 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S.
901 (1988); Yancey v. Carroll County, 674 F. Supp. 572, 575 (E.D. Ky. 1987),
aff'd, 884 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1989); Tobias, supra note 1, at 490-507; Vairo, supra,
at 200-02, 205, 213-14; Note, PlausiblePleadings: Developing Standardsfor Rule 11
Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630, 631 (1987).
5. See S. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION (1989) (report of Third Circuit
Task Force); Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in
the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1338-52
(1986); Vairo, supra note 4, at 199-201. The year 1989 is an approximate date to
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Professors Nelken and Vairo, who each undertook comprehensive
studies, found that Rule 11 motions were filed and granted
against civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys much more often than
against civil rights defendants and their counsel, and that the
plaintiffs were sanctioned at a higher rate than those who brought
any other type of federal civil claim. 6 A Task Force that analyzed
all Rule 11 activity in the Third Circuit over a one-year period
found that courts were considerably more likely to sanction civil
7
rights plaintiffs than they were other litigants.
Application of the Rule is a two-stage process: determining
whether it has been violated, and, if so, selecting the appropriate
sanction. Some judges and numerous commentators asserted
that judges strictly enforced against civil rights plaintiffs and practitioners the Rule's requirements of reasonable factual investigations and legal inquiries before filing court papers. 8 Yet judges
apparently applied the mandatory sanctions requirement rather'
leniently and levied comparatively few large sanctions against civil
rights plaintiffs and attorneys. 9 It does not necessarily follow that
the judicial implementation had minimal impact on the parties
and lawyers. For example, courts' selection of monetary assessments as the sanction of choice, combined with substantial awards
in a small number of civil rights actions, may well have detrimentally affected civil rights litigants and their counsel.' 0
There was considerable lack of consensus in the judicial application of the Rule to many significant issues. Courts differed
which I do not rigidly adhere, and it can vary from circuit to circuit and even
within districts.
6. See Nelken, supra note 5, at 1327; Vairo, supra note 4, at 200-01.
7. See S. BURBANK, supra note 5, at 69. The Task Force studied motions filed
under the Rule from July 1, 1987, to June 30, 1988, in the five district courts
within the Third Circuit. It ascertained that in cases in which defendants had
filed Rule 11 motions, courts sanctioned civil rights plaintiffs 47.1% of the time
as compared to 8.45%7 for plaintiffs in non-civil rights cases.
8. See, e.g., Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1082-85 (five dense paragraphs and 20 case
citations necessary to show plaintiff's due process claim "wacky"); Rodgers v.
Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194, 205-06 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming finding of
Rule violation although information important to plaintiff's compliance with
Rule was only available upon discovery); see also LaFrance, Federal Rule 11 and
Public Interest Litigation, 22 VAL. U.L. REV. 331, 333 (1988) (Rule 11 is antithetical
to public interest law); Vairo, supra note 4, at 200-02, 213-14 (statistics show
stricter application in civil rights cases).
9. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 164; see also Tobias, supra note 1, at 498-501.
There were a few large sanctions awards, however. See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 705
F. Supp 1544 (S.D. Fla.) (sanction of$1,000,000), order clarified by 125 F.R.D. 189
(S.D. Fla. 1989) (attorney and clients jointly and severally liable), appealdocketed,
No. 89-5515 (11 th Cir. May 30, 1989).
10. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 165; Tobias, supra note 1, at 500-01.
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over exactly what plaintiffs must do to satisfy the amendment's
reasonable prefiling inquiry requirements. The courts frequently
confused the reasonableness of prefiling inquiries with the quality
of the papers submitted or the merits of the litigation."I Judges
who agreed that civil rights plaintiffs or practitioners had contravened the Rule often disagreed substantially about the proper
purpose, kind and size of sanctions in similar factual
2
circumstances. '
Many courts and writers criticized the inconsistent judicial
implementation of the Rule. For instance, Professor Vairo observed that the consensus that had previously existed in the appellate courts had begun to unravel by 1986,1 3 while Professor
Burbank found a "conflict between or among circuits on practically every important question of interpretation and policy under
the Rule" as recently as early 1989.14 In one case in which the
district judge had levied a $1000 sanction, a circuit judge chastised the other members of his panel for suggesting that the lower
court might exercise its discretion to assess a sanction of
$10,000-he found a $53,000 award appropriate.' 5 There was
also much unnecessary, costly litigation over issues exogenous to
the merits of the lawsuits. 16 Concerned that excessively rigid im11. See, e.g., Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 485 (3d Cir. 1987);
Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1987); see also

FED. PROCEDURE
COMM., SECTION OF LITIG., A.B.A., SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS 1819 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter SANCTIONS]. The papers' quality and the merits of

the underlying dispute are not irrelevant. The judge, however, should first attempt to ascertain whether the prefiling inquiry was reasonable. Only after such
an attempt is inconclusive should the judge examine the papers or the merits to
inform the reasonableness determination. See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1933-34,
1942, 1948; Tobias, supra note 4, at 168 n.37.
12. See, e.g., Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, Employees
or Officers, 855 F.2d 1080, 1083, 1093-94 (3d Cir. 1988) (award of $17,163 to
American Legion remanded for recalculation with suggestion that considerable
reduction appropriate);Johnson v. New York City Transit Auth., 823 F.2d 31, 33
(2d Cir. 1987) (award of $3450 remanded for recalculation); infra note 15 and
accompanying text.
13. See Vairo, supra note 4, at 205-07; accord SANCTIONS, supra note 11, at 1416.
14. Burbank, supra note 3, at 1930-31.
15. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 126 (2d
Cir.) (Pratt, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987); see also Tobias, supra
note 1, at 499-500 (more thorough treatment of Eastway litigation). Judge Pratt
also chided his colleagues for fostering arbitrary and inconsistent sanctions decisionmaking and for disregarding the Rule's "second purpose"-compensation.
16. Satellite litigation often involved technical issues, such as the meaning
of the Rule's phraseology, or tangential questions, such as the proper amount of
attorneys' fees to award. See, e.g., Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs
Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540 (1986), dissent from denial of en banc reh'g, 809 F.2d
584 (9th Cir. 1987); Eastway, 821 F.2d 121.
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plementation of the Rule would foster satellite litigation, one circuit judge warned that a majority of his panel appeared "almost at
the point of saying that the main question before the court is not
'Are you right?' but 'Are you sanctionable?' -17
Many civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys have an acute lack of
time and money. It is important to understand that the Rule's
vigorous invocation required civil rights attorneys who litigated in
objective good faith to spend substantial resources defending
their reputations and their wallets. Resource restraints make
them particularly susceptible to being chilled by overly enthusiastic application of the Rule. 18 One dissenting judge specifically admonished that overzealous, technical application of the Rule
would chill the most, as well as the least, legitimate civil rights
action. 19 Some courts championed careful enforcement in civil
rights cases, apparently evincing concern about chilling, 20 while
others remarked more generally that overzealous application
could limit the creativity and enthusiasm of civil rights plaintiffs
and attorneys. 2 I Numerous commentators concurred with, and
22
expanded on, these judicial observations.
17. Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1086 (7th Cir.
1987) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. dismissed, 485
U.S. 901 (1988); see also Yancey v. Carroll County, 674 F. Supp. 572, 575 (E.D.
Ky. 1987) ("I would not be surprised if shortly the Rule I tail were wagging the
substantive law dog in many cases."), aff'd, 884 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1989). Moreover, the Rule's vigorous enforcement may have effectively imposed stricter
pleading requirements on civil rights plaintiffs, if only to avoid opponents' requests for sanctions. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 494; see also Marcus, The Revival
of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433,
449 (1986).
18. See Letter from Professor George Cochran, University of Mississippi
School of Law, to addressees working on Rule 11 Project (Mar. 26, 1990) [hereinafter Letter] (copy on file with author). Although some observers may contend that defending against motions under the Rule is a fixed, fair cost of
litigating in federal court, it is one that is borne disproportionately by civil rights
plaintiffs and lawyers, who have little ability to assume the substantial expense.
19. Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1086 (Cudahy,J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc. 836 F.2d 866, 877 (5th Cir.
20. See, e.g.,
1988) (advisory committee note expressly disclaims any intent to chill attorneys'
enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories); Yancey, 674 F.
Supp. at 575 (concern about chilling good faith zealous advocacy in civil rights
litigation); see also Tobias, supra note 1, at 506-07.
Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1561 (11th Cir. 1987)
21. See, e.g.,
("Nor is Rule 11 intended to chill innovative theories and rigorous advocacy that
bring about vital and positive changes to the law."); Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d
463, 468 (4th Cir. 1987) (ButznerJ., dissenting) ("Plaintiffs' attorney's creativity
in seeking to argue the theory of qualified immunity was squarely within the
scope of Rule 11."); see also Tobias, supra note 4, at 166.
22. See SANCTIONS, supra note 11, at 23-24 (although not explicitly analyzing
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RECENT JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF RULE

11

The enforcement of the Rule in civil rights litigation has apparently improved over the past two years and particularly during
1990.23 During 1990, panels in more than half of the federal circuits enforced the provision in ways that were solicitous of the
needs of civil rights plaintiffs and their counsel. 24 This section
explores whether judicial application actually has been enhanced
and, if so, whether the improved implementation will suffice for
25
effective civil rights enforcement.
A. Apparent Improvements in Judicial Application
Each circuit has issued rulings that are solicitous of the needs
of civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys, and a surprising number
have been published in the last year. 26 Underlying many of these
civil rights actions); Nelken, supra note 5, at 1338-46; Vairo, supra note 4, at 199201. Several writers stated that critics' fears that the amendment would chill
legitimate advocacy were well-founded. See Nelken, supra note 5, at 1339; Vairo,
supra note 4, at 200. One court and a few commentators asserted that it was
impossible to determine how many valid lawsuits were abandoned out of concern about expensive satellite litigation or substantial assessments. See Yancey,
674 F. Supp. at 575; Elson & Rothschild, Rule 11: Objectivity and Competence, 123
F.R.D. 361, 365 (1988); Vairo, supra note 4, at 201. Considerable anecdotal data
on threats to sanction civil rights lawyers suggest that the amendment's application could have dampened the practitioners' enthusiasm. See Tobias, supra note
1, at 502, 505 (data gleaned from conversations with civil rights and public interest lawyers); see also Thomas, 836 F.2d at 871 n.4 (quoting Center for Constitutional Rights' memorandum on proposed Rule 11 project) (civil rights attorneys
believe they were "primary victims of Rule 11"). These conclusions comport
with reasonable inferences that might be derived from the Rule's judicial enforcement during the applicable period.
23. The two year period is an approximation, and geographic variations do
exist. See supra note 5. In this section, I emphasize judicial application during
1990, supplementing it with earlier examples when appropriate.
24. Some of the appellate courts have reversed the decisions of district
judges imposing sanctions on civil rights plaintiffs and warned about the possible chilling effects of overly stringent application in civil rights cases. See infra
notes 26-36 and accompanying text. Other circuit courts have deferred to determinations by trial judges that civil rights litigants had not violated Rule 11 and
to decisions awarding small assessments against those civil rights plaintiffs who
did contravene the amendment. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. A
significant number of district courts have evinced special concern for these litigants and lawyers, often finding that plaintiffs pursuing comparatively weak
claims had not violated the revised provision. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
25. While judicial application is the focus of this analysis, other considerations, such as the Advisory Committee's activities, are examined where relevant.
See infra note 91; cf Tobias, supra note 4, at 167-71 (additional relevant factors).
26. See Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
681 (1991); Alia v. Michigan Supreme Ct., 906 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1990); Davis
v. Carl, 906 F.2d 533 (11 th Cir. 1990); Jenkins v. Missouri, 904 F.2d 415 (8th
Cir. 1990); Cooper v. City of Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1990); Simpson
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opinions is the concern that the imposition of sanctions might
dampen the enthusiasm of those who pursue civil rights actions.
A recent Seventh Circuit opinion provides one of the clearest articulations of this concern. 2 7 In finding that the trial court's
award of sanctions was erroneous, the appellate panel stated that
"Rule 11 cannot be allowed to thoroughly undermine zealous advocacy. . . . This is especially so in civil rights cases involving
unpopular clients." ' 28 The court invoked the important admonition that the Rule was "not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories." 29
Other appellate panels recently have demonstrated similar
reluctance to sanction those who seek to enforce civil rights. For
instance, vacating a determination that a plaintiff had violated the
Rule in Title VII litigation, the Fourth Circuit observed:
Even a vague and conclusory complaint may be "well
grounded in fact and . . . warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Indeed, if
Rule 11 permitted sanctions merely on the basis of inartful pleading, rather than for a failure to investigate
the legal and factual basis for that pleading, Rule 12(e)
motions for a more definite statement would be virtually
unheard of.

30

v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1990); Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d
40 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Cruz v. Savage, 896 F.2d 626 (1st Cir. 1990); Kraemer v.
Grant County, 892 F.2d 686 (7th Cir. 1990); O'Rourke v. City of Norman, 875
F.2d 1465 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 280 (1989); Woodrum v. Woodward
County, 866 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1989); Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1988).
27. See Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 F.2d 686 (7th Cir. 1990). Kraemer has
special significance because certain judges on the Seventh Circuit have been the
strongest proponents of the amendment's vigorous implementation. See, e.g.,
Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 419-20 (7th Cir. 1988); Szabo Food
Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485
U.S. 901 (1988); Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists,
Dist. No. 8, 802 F.2d 247, 255 (7th Cir. 1986); see also S. BURBANK, supra note 5,
at 59 (suspecting that "iceberg" of unreported Rule 11 decisions is large in Seventh Circuit).
28. Kraemer, 892 F.2d at 690; accord Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l Co., 870 F.2d
926, 935 (2d Cir.), vacated, 875 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1989) (remanded for factual
rehearing); Davis v. Crush, 862 F.2d 84, 92 (6th Cir. 1988).
29. Kraemer, 892 F.2d at 690 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee
note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983)); see also Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235, 1240
(11 th Cir. 1989) (also quoting advisory committee note); Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1989) (indirectly citing same note).
30. Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1990). The court also
found that the Rule was an "inappropriate vehicle for the imposition" of sanc-
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Another appeals court similarly remarked that its decision to remand the merits of two of plaintiff's counts to the trial judge for
additional proceedings was a "strong indication that we do not
consider these claims 'frivolous and not warranted by the law.' "31
Two appellate panels have reversed lower courts' rulings on the
substantive controversies, which meant that they had to vacate the
32
sanctions imposed.
Some of these circuit courts have analyzed very closely the
plaintiff's prefiling investigations and have occasionally found
that the trial courts had improperly assessed their reasonableness. 3 3 Several of the appellate panels have recognized that in
determining reasonableness it is important to consider the limited time which civil rights lawyers frequently have for performing
the prefiling investigations.3 4 Certain courts have reversed apparently because they simply believed that plaintiffs had satisfied
the Rule. 3 5 Moreover, a few judges have stated that a finding of
tions "because of appellant's counsel's 'blatant disregard' for the local rules of
the district court and for 'his lackadaisical attitude in failing to respond to defendants' Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees.' " Id. at 36-37 (quoting district
court opinion). Two recent Fourth Circuit opinions, however, evince little solicitude for civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers. See Blue v. United States Dep't of the
Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), petitionfor cert.filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S.
Dec. 17, 1990) (No. 90-1076) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3570); In re Kunstler,
914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990), petitions for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov.
11, 1990) (No. 90-802) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3465), 59 U.S.L.W. 3406
(U.S. Nov. 19, 1990) (No. 90-807) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3466), 59
U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1991) (No. 90-1094) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W.
3566); see also infra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing Blue and Kunstler).
31. Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 596 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 129 (1990).
32. See Cooper v. City of Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1990)
(district court sanctioned attorney on grounds that reasonable inquiry would
have shown no property interest in contraband; court of appeals found property
interest); O'Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465, 1476 (10th Cir.) (reversed district court on constitutionality of night-time execution of warrant), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 280 (1989); cf. Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262,
1274 (10th Cir. 1989) (observing that two civil rights claims should not have
been dismissed in context of affirming denial of sanctions).
33. See, e.g., Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1990);Jenkins v.
Missouri, 904 F.2d 415, 420-21 (8th Cir. 1990); Simpson, 900 F.2d at 36-37; Triad
Assocs., 892 F.2d at 596.
34. See Jenkins, 904 F.2d at 421; Gillette v. Delmore, 886 F.2d 1194, 1199200 (9th Cir. 1989) (attorney retained shortly before statute of limitations would
have run); accord Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 467 (4th Cir. 1987) (Butzner, J.,
dissenting) ("Frequently attorneys must act quickly to meet statutory deadlines."); cf. Cruz v. Savage, 896 F.2d 626, 633 (1st Cir. 1990) (careful examination of whether district judge considered reasonableness of lawyer's behavior at
time lawyer acted).
35. See, e.g. ,Jenkins, 904 F.2d at 420-21; Gillette, 886 F.2d at 1200; accordAlia
v. Michigan Supreme Court, 906 F.2d 1100, 1108 (6th Cir. 1990) (Wellford, J.,
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violation must be based on the "paper as a whole," rather than on
each allegation. 3 6 A number of circuit courts also have deferred
to trial court determinations that civil rights plaintiffs had not
37
contravened the Rule.
Appellate courts also have been solicitous of civil rights
plaintiffs and attorneys when reviewing the mandatory sanctions
imposed by lower courts. 38 For example, the Fifth Circuit reduced the assessment levied on a pro se civil rights litigant from
$20,000 to $1800. 39 The Sixth Circuit characterized the sanctioning of civil rights plaintiffs with attorneys' fees as an "extreme
sanction" that should be employed only in instances of outrageous misbehavior. 40 Similarly, a First Circuit panel commended
a trial judge for remembering that "sanctions should not be imposed to chill an attorney's enthusiasm, creativity or zealous advocacy," '4 ' when the lower court granted $3000 in attorneys' fees
dissenting) (reversing sanctions Where "claims were neither unfounded, baseless, nor made in bad faith .... [They] involv[ed] difficult and complex issues
and were in no sense frivolous"). A second member of the three-judge panel
joined Judge Weliford's resolution of the sanctions issue, thereby reversing the
district court. See id. (Boggs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
36. See Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Rule 11
does not apply when one prong . . .of a claim is deficient, but other prongs
support . . .the pleading or motion."); Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d
1418, 1429 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting sanctions where several of complaint's allegations without foundation). But see Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp.,
914 F.2d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc), overruling Murphy v. Business
Cards Tomorrow, Inc., 854 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1988) (sanctions rejected
even if two allegations plainly false, if pleading as whole not frivolous); infra note
69 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22, 36 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirming
district court's refusal to impose sanctions), cert. denied sub nom. Perkins v. General Motors Corp., 59 U.S.L.W. 3635 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1991); NAACP Special Contribution Fund v. Atkins, 908 F.2d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 1990) (district court
correctly denied sanctions because plaintiff's pleadings posed some difficult
questions); Phelps, 886 F.2d at 1274; Tabrizi v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 883 F.2d
587, 593 (7th Cir. 1989) (correct to deny sanctions where most of complaint was
dismissed procedurally); O'Neal v. Dekalb County, 850 F.2d 653, 658 (11 th Cir.
1988) ("We agree with the district court that although the plaintiff's section
1983 suit does not merit relief, their causes of action were plausible.").
38. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (court "shall impose.., an appropriate sanction,
which may include ...the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of
the . . .paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee") (emphasis added).
39. Coats v. Pierre, 890 F.2d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 1989) ($20,000 excessive
and $1800 sufficient given plaintiffs economic circumstances), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 70 (1990).
40. Morrison v. Lipscomb, 877 F.2d 463, 469 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting
Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1232 (6th Cir. 1986) ("[A]ward of
attorney's fees against a losing plaintiff in a civil rights action is an extreme sanction, and must be limited to truly egregious cases of misconduct.")).
41. Cruz v. Savage, 896 F.2d 626, 634 (1st Cir. 1990).
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rather than the $40,000 that defendants had requested. 4 2 Some
appellate judges have recognized the pertinence of a violator's
ability to pay the sanction imposed and have urged trial courts
43
seriously to consider imposing non-monetary assessments.
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit, in modifying an earlier panel decision, has observed that the Rule is "not a fee-shifting statute in
the sense that the loser pays ... [but] is a law imposing sanctions
if counsel files with improper motives or inadequate investigation." 44 Several courts apparently have recognized the resource
45
restraints that plague many civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers.
Developments in the district courts also merit attention.
Much of the Rule's application is similar to appellate court enforcement. 4 6 For instance, one judge was "reluctant to impose
Rule 11 sanctions absent egregious conduct" by counsel, because
42. Cruz v. Savage, 691 F. Supp. 549, 556 (D.P.R. 1988) ("[three thousand
dollars] is an amount the Court finds suitable for its purposes with respect to the
specific conduct proscribed in . . .Rule 11 while still avoiding the impression
that the sanction is imposed to chill counsel's proper zealous conduct."), aft'd,
896 F.2d 626 (1st Cir. 1990).
43. See, e.g., Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(considering ability to pay and deterence of litigation abuse); Doering v. Union
County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 195-97 (3d Cir. 1988) (court
should consider offender's ability to pay as mitigating factor in determining
amount of monetary sanction); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d
866, 876-81 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[A]s a less severe alternative to monetary sanctions, district courts may choose to admonish or reprimand attorneys who violate Rule 11."). A four-part formula for calculating sanctions recently
enunciated by the Tenth Circuit includes many factors solicitous of civil rights
plaintiffs. See White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 684-85 (10th Cir.
1990) (court should consider (1) reasonableness of fees requested using traditional lodestar approach, (2) minimum necessary to deter misconduct, (3) offender's ability to pay, (4) other factors, including offender's experience and
ability, severity of violation, bad faith and risks of chilling); accord In re Kunstler,
914 F.2d 505, 523-25 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing White), petitions for cert. filed, 59
U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1990) (No. 90-802) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W.
3465), 59 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1990) (No. 90-807) (summarized at 59
U.S.L.W. 3466), 59 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1991) (No. 90-1094) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3566).
44. Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir.
1989) (en banc); see Cooter & Gell v. Hartmark Corp., 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2462
(1990) (Rule 11 not fee-shifting statute); Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous.
Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 596 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Mars Steel), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 129 (1990); see also Hays v. Sony Corp., 847 F.2d 412, 419-20 (7th Cir. 1988).
45. See, e.g., Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 1990);
Doering, 857 F.2d at 195-97.
46. Of course, appellate review differs substantially from trial court decision making. See generally Cooter & Gell, 110 S.Ct. at 2461 (prescribing abuse of
discretion standard for appellate review of all district court Rule 11 decisionmaking); Mars Steel, 880 F.2d at 933-36 (standards for appellate review); Rosenberg,Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewedfrom Above, 22 SYRACUSE L.REV.
635 (1971).
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the court did not want to repress efforts to vindicate civil rights
through the injudicious use of sanctions. 4 7 Another judge refused to sanction a civil rights lawyer and acknowledged that the
"pressures of filing a timely complaint" were central to ascertaining the reasonableness of a prefiling inquiry. 48 Finally, some district courts, though sanctioning civil rights litigants, have
expressed reluctance4 9 or exercised restraint in assessing the
sanctions. 50
There are, however, certain differences in application of the
Rule at the trial level. Quite a few judges have found that parties
pursuing arguably weak civil rights claims had not violated the
amendment. 5' Demonstrating appreciation for the pragmatic difficulties of pleading and proving discrimination cases, two district
courts have come considerably closer than appellate courts to articulating a special, more favorable standard for civil rights
52
plaintiffs.
47. Levy v. City of New York, 726 F. Supp. 1446, 1456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
48. Costello v. Daddario, 710 F. Supp. 1035, 1037-38 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (because clients could not identify particular officer who assaulted them, counsel
could not responsibly omit potential defendants in drafting complaint under
time pressure).
49. See Goldberg v. Weil, 707 F. Supp. 357, 362 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (court
reluctant, but ordered pro se plaintiff to pay $400 of defendants' legal fees).
50. See, e.g., Rice v. Hilton Hotel Corp., No. 85-1470, slip op. at 4-5 (D.D.C.
Sept. 9, 1988) ($5000 awarded despite expenditure of $68,000), aff'd sub nom.
Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Cruz v. Savage, 691
F. Supp. 549, 556 (D.P.R. 1988), aff'd, 896 F.2d 626 (1st Cir. 1990).
51. See, e.g., Solberg v. Inline Corp., 740 F. Supp. 680, 686 (D. Minn. 1990)
(plaintiffs suing under new and untested statute did not violate Rule by failing to
anticipate defense); Moore v. Roth, No. 90C 1097 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 1990) (1990
WL 60735) (refusing to sanction and permitting filing of amended complaint,
although if court determined Rule had been violated, plaintiffs' pro se status
would not insulate them from sanctions); Summer v. Fuller, 718 F. Supp. 1523,
1525 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (good faith attempt to extend existing law where attorney
sued district attorney for refusing to allow plaintiff's husband, an assistant district attorney, to prosecute case against defendants represented by plaintiff);
Gordon v. Hercules, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Kan. 1989) (failure to establish
prima facie case of racial discrimination does not justify sanctions). A few courts
have granted civil rights plaintiffs' motions for sanctions. See, e.g., Littlefield v.
Mack, 750 F. Supp. 1395, 1403 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (imposing sanctions on civil
rights defendant); Byrne v. Board of Educ., 741 F. Supp. 167, 171 (E.D. Wis.
1990) (defendant's contention that appellate opinions were "at odds with the
view" of the district court was "not only thin and unconvincing, but also ...
preposterous and wacky"); cf United States v. City of San Francisco, 132 F.R.D.
533, 538 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (because defendant made no good faith argument
supporting Rule 11 motion, plaintiff intervenors awarded costs of defending
motion).
52. See Tutton v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 733 F. Supp. 1113, 1118
(N.D. Tex. 1990) ("[Nlothing in Rule II prevents a court qua fact-finder from
considering the inherent proof difficulties placed upon a discrimination plain-
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In short, this assessment suggests that judicial application
of the Rule has improved for civil rights plaintiffs and practitioners. Several important considerations, however, make it difficult
to formulate definitive conclusions about this apparent
improvement.
B.

Qualifications of the Apparent Improvements

The suggestion of recent improvement in the Rule's enforcement is subject to a number of qualifications. Since January 1989,
the civil rights bar has continued to voice substantial concern
over the Rule's enforcement. 5 3 Indeed, one civil rights lawyer recently observed: "It is too late to ask such questions as: is there
excessive satellite litigation; is imaginative lawyering being chilled; are attorney fee awards too often employed as the sanction of
choice; has the Rule generated 'unnecessary hostility' among lawyers; and whether procedural safeguards are in order. ' 54 Numerous judges have not hesitated to find civil rights litigants or their
lawyers in violation of the Rule, 5 5 and appellate courts have uptiff."); Pickens v. Children's Mercy Hosp., 124 F.R.D. 209, 211 (W.D. Mo. 1989)
("Very little objective circumstantial proof beyond an unfavorable employment
action is required to save a person making a good faith claim of racial discrimination from sanctions for filing a frivolous case."). The Tutton court disavowed
any intent to "engraft judicially on Rule 11 a higher sanction standard in a discrimination case than is found in the text of the Rule." Tutton, 733 F. Supp. at
1118; cf. Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 535 (4th Cir.
1990) ("It would be an irony if the concept of equality under the law, so fundamental to the goal of civil rights, were underwritten with exceptions for Title VII
litigants from the legal rules that apply to all others."), petitionfor cert. filed, 59
U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1990) (No. 90-1076) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W.
3570). Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1279-81 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting
"special treatment" under the Rule for "attorneys who handle unpopular civil
rights claims"), cert. denied sub nom. Suffolk County v. Graseck, 480 U.S. 918
(1987). See generally supra note 17 (possibility of stricter treatment of civil rights
plaintiffs).
53. This claim is premised on conversations with civil rights and public interest attorneys. Their concern had been substantial before. See Tobias, supra
note 4, at 170 n.46 and accompanying text.
54. Letter, supra note 18, at 3; see also Nelken, The Impact of Federal Rule 11 on
Lawyers and Judges in the Northern District of California, 74 JUDICATURE 147, 152
(1990) (recent study finding chilling effects on developments in law); Tobias,
supra note 4, at 170 n.46 (other anecdotes and telephone conversations concerning chilling); infra note 67 (three troubling cases).
55. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1494, 1500-01 (S.D.
Fla. 1989) (sanctions imposed on plaintiff's counsel because two claims against
three defendants included conclusory allegations which were insufficient to state
claim for relief, although claim against fourth defendant presented justiciable
issues of fact), reconsideration denied, 729 F. Supp. 1329 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Goldberg
v. Weil, 707 F. Supp. 357, 362 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (sanctioning pro se plaintiff). For
examples of decisions refusing to sanction civil rights plaintiffs or attorneys for
pursuing arguably weak claims, see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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56
held sanctions in what appeared to be close cases.
There is another important reason not to be overly optimistic
about the recent improvements in published opinions. Recent
data on decisionmaking under the Rule demonstrate that approximately ninety percent of it does not appear in the federal reporter system and that less than forty percent of it is on
computerized services. 5 7 The dearth of reported decisions
thwarts efforts to reach conclusions. It is in the informal setting
that courts are most likely to apply the Rule in ways that disadvantage civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys, 58 and there are numerous
anecdotal reports of such application. 59 One complaint is that
judges in chambers threaten to sanction civil rights practitioners
60
if they refuse to retract certain substantive claims.

Those decisions that are published warrant several other
56. See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 915 F.2d 965, 968 (5th Cir. 1990) (deferential appellate review in apparently close case); Jennings v. Joshua Indep.
School Dist., 869 F.2d 870, 879 (although close case with respect to sanctions
and, given factual circumstances, panel might have ruled otherwise if sitting as
district judges, it could not say district court abused its discretion in finding that
complaint violated Rule), amended and superseded, 877 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1989)
(sanction of $84,000 remanded for reconsideration in light of Thomas v. Capital
Security Services, Inc., 838 F. 2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988) (discussed supra note 20)),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3212 (1990).
57. See S. BURBANK, supra note 5, at 59, 98-99. Substantial differences in
publication practices exist because courts may base their decision whether to
publish on a host of considerations, such as concern for a lawyer's reputation, in
addition to the Rule's principal purpose, which is deterrence. See Thomas v.
Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 876-81 (5th Cir. 1988) (same as to sanctioning and Rule's purpose); S. BURBANK, supra note 5, at 4-6, 44-45, 97 (more
discussion of problems involved in relying only on reported Rule 11 activity);
Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Rule ]1-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 202
(1985) (helpful treatment of publication and Rule's purposes); Tobias, supra
note 4, at 169.
58. Reported decisions are one of the least likely sources in which deleterious judicial treatment would appear. It would at least be "bad form" to disadvantage, much less evince hostility toward, the litigants in print. Some courts
arguably come close to doing so. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 897
F.2d 243, 244 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[Tlhe interests of black women are probably
better represented now than they were [in 1984]. By 1984 the United States had
lost its enthusiasm for quotas."); Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823
F.2d 1073, 1083-85 (7th Cir. 1987) ("The picture is of all tompetitors trying to
darken the corporate color."), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988). It is much
easier to take similar action informally.
59. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 502-03 & n.60. Civil rights and public interest attorneys have informed the author of such application. Of course, it is difficult to document informal activity, because lawyers are justifiably reluctant to
publicize what they consider improper conduct by judges before whom they regularly appear.
60. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 502-03 & nn.61-62 (premised on interviews
with civil rights and public interest attorneys); Tobias, supra note 4, at 170 n.46
(same).
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qualifications. Opinions that impose or uphold sanctions may
have negative effects on parties other than the particular litigants
involved. Some opinions include language deprecating the efforts of those who seek to enforce civil rights through litigation in
the federal courts. For example, in Saltany v. Reagan,61 fifty-five

Libyan residents and citizens brought suit to recover damages
sustained during the United States bombing of Libya in 1986.62
The defendants 6 3 moved to dismiss the claims and for sanctions
under the Rule. The district court dismissed the claims but denied the motion for sanctions in the interest of maintaining the
federal court as a forum for litigation pursued as a "public statement of protest of Presidential action with which counsel (and, to
be sure, their clients) were in profound disagreement." 64 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia summarily reversed
and remanded the case with instructions to impose an appropriate sanction, finding that filing a "complaint that 'plaintiffs' attorneys surely knew' had 'no hope whatsoever of success' " violated
the Rule. 6 5 The court of appeals did "not conceive it a proper
function of a federal court to serve as a forum for 'protests,' to the
66
detriment of parties with serious disputes waiting to be heard."
The case could prove problematic for civil rights plaintiffs insofar
as a considerable amount of civil rights litigation is in some sense
67
a "public statement of protest."
61. Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (Buckley,
D. Ginsburg and Sentelle, JJ.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2172 (1990). See generally
D'Amato, The Imposition of Attorney Sanctionsfor Claims Arisingfrom the U.S. Air Raid
on Libya, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1990) (criticizing Saltany).
62. Saltany, 886 F.2d at 439.
63. The defendants were the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the two nations themselves and others. See Saltany
v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 320 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 886
F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2172 (1990).
64. Saltany, 886 F.2d at 439 (quoting Saltany, 702 F. Supp. at 322). The
district court had concluded: "It cannot, therefore, be said that the case is frivolous so much as it is audacious." Saltany, 702 F. Supp. at 322.
65. Saltany, 886 F.2d at 440 (quoting Saltany, 702 F. Supp. at 322).
66. Id.
67. Saltany, 702 F. Supp. at 322. In addition to Saltany, three cases at various stages in the appellate process, unless modified, will disadvantage civil
rights plaintiffs and their counsel. The appeal of a $1,000,000 sanction imposed
on a non-profit public interest entity is pending in the Eleventh Circuit. See Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544, 1545 (S.D. Fla.) (court found counsel's allegations unsubstantial), order clarified, 125 F.R.D. 189 (S.D. Fla.) (attorney and
clients jointly and severally liable), appeal docketed, No. 89-5515 (11 th Cir. May
30, 1989). Avirgan could be said to resemble Saltany in that it represents a protest against allegedly improper American political activity in Latin America.
Oral argument inAvirgan was scheduled for the week of February 25, 1991. Tel-
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Moreover, courts do not always display an appreciation of
certain important subtleties involved in applying the Rule to civil
rights cases. For example, even judges who have written a
number of the clearer decisions continue to employ a "product"
approach to possible violations rather than focusing on the conduct of litigants and lawyers. 68 A few courts that emphasized the
quality of the papers tendered by the plaintiffs have subjected to
69
scrutiny each count, claim or allegation.
Numerous judges have been insufficiently attentive to the
needs of civil rights plaintiffs in choosing the appropriate sanction
ephone interview with Joanne Royce, Litigation Department, Christie Institute,
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 22, 1991) (plaintiff's counsel).
In the other two cases, the Fourth Circuit has affirmed findings of Rule 11
violations but vacated and remanded the sanctions determinations as inappropriate. See Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1384-93 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (sanction of $84,000 levied in employment discrimination litigation), vacated in part on
reconsideration, 123 F.R.D. 204 (E.D.N.C. 1988), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded
in part sub nom. Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir.
1990) (affirming finding of Rule violation, vacating and remanding sanctions determination),petitionforcert.filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1990) (No. 901076) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3570); Robeson Defense Comm. v. Britt, 132
F.R.D. 650 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (sanction of $122,834 imposed in civil rights litigation involving Native Americans and African Americans in Robeson County),
aff 'd in part, vacated and remanded in part sub nom. In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th
Cir. 1990) (affirming finding of Rule violation, vacating and remanding sanctions determination), petitionsforcert.filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1990)
(No. 90-802) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3465), 59 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov.
19, 1990) (No. 90-807) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3466), 59 U.S.L.W. 3503
(U.S. Jan. 8, 1991) (No. 90-1094) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3566).
68. Judges who adopt the "product" approach fail to emphasize the reasonableness of prefiling inquiries and instead concentrate on the quality of the papers submitted or the merits of lawsuits. See S. BURBANK, supra note 5, at 46; see,
e.g., Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1990) (emphasizing merits);
Davis v. Carl, 906 F.2d 533, 535-36 (11 th Cir. 1990) (same); Triad Assocs., Inc.
v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 596 (7th Cir. 1989) (sanctions determination rested on merits of suit as measure of reasonableness of prefiling inquiry),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 129 (1990); Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418,
1429 (9th Cir. 1989) (that some allegations made at litigation's outset later
proved unfounded did not render frivolous complaint that also included some
nonfrivolous claims); Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, Employees or Officers, 855 F.2d 1080, 1091 (3d Cir. 1988) (filing of claim was legally frivolous); see also supra note 11.
69. See Frantz v. United States Powerlifting Fed'n, 836 F.2d 1063, 1067 (7th
Cir. 1987) (in antitrust case, "each [claim] must be investigated and researched
before filing"); PaineWebber, Inc. v. Can'Am Fin. Group, Ltd., 121 F.R.D. 324,
330 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("Rule 11 applies to every statement and claim in a paper"),
aft'd, 885 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Melrose v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 898 F.2d 1209, 1215-16 (7th Cir. 1990) ("It ... is neither contrary to
the language of Rule 11 as amended, nor an abuse of discretion for the district
court to undertake such a detailed [point-by-point] analysis [of a pleading or
motion] when the court believes the circumstances warrant it."); Triad Assocs.,
892 F.2d at 596-97; supra note 36 and accompanying text (especially Ninth Circuit cases).
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for contravention of the Rule. For instance, some courts have not
specifically considered a plaintiff's ability to pay or the difference
between monetary and non-monetary awards. 70 Similarly, they
have not attempted to impose the "least severe sanction" necessary to achieve the Rule's purposes. 7' These factors suggest that
too few members of the federal bench fully understand the impli72
cations of their Rule 11 enforcement for civil rights plaintiffs.
Another important qualification is that substantial variations
exist within and among the circuits and probably will persist. 73
Differently constituted panels in the same circuit may issue quite
dissimilar Rule 11 opinions.7 4 The uncertainty is exacerbated because there is slight chance of convincing a court to grant rehear70. See, e.g., West Coast Theater Corp. v. City of Portland, 897 F.2d 1519
(9th Cir. 1990) (no analysis of proper type of sanction or party's ability to pay);
Jennings v. Joshua Indep. School Dist., 869 F.2d 871 (5th Cir.) (same), amended
and superseded, 877 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1989) (remanded to insure justification
corresponded to amount, type and effect of sanctions imposed), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 3212 (1990).
71. See, e.g., Triad Assocs., 892 F.2d at 596-97 (approving district court's
monetary sanctions without analyzing appropriateness of other sanctions); cf
Jennings, 877 F.2d at 322 (remanding to district court for imposition of least severe sanction). For a discussion of appropriate sanctions and examples of cases
considering the matter, see supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
72. For example, the parties may be discouraged nearly as much by the possibility of costly satellite litigation as by the imposition of sanctions. See supra
note 1; Tobias, supra note 1, at 501 n.57. For examples of courts that have recognized the threat satellite litigation poses to litigants with few resources, see
supra note 45 and accompanying text.
73. See S. BURBANK, supra note 5, at 46, 96-97; T. WILLGING, THE RULE 11
SANCTIONING PROCESS

178-89 (1988). Certain difficulties, such as predicting

trends in civil litigation and the future composition of the federal bench, obviously complicate prognostication.
74. Indeed, in some circuits the panel might be insensitive or even hostile.
Compare Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 F.2d 686 (7th Cir. 1990) (Wood, Cudahy
and Ripple, JJ.) with Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073
(7th Cir. 1987) (Cudahy, Posner and Easterbrook, JJ.), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S.
901 (1988) and Dreis & Krump Mfg. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 802
F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1986) (Cummings, Posner and Gordon, JJ.). For those who
think the Seventh Circuit is anomalous, compare the treatment given Julius
Chambers in Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir.
1990) (Ervin, C.J. and Phillips and Wilkinson, JJ.), petition for cert. filed, 59
U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1990) (No. 90-1076) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W.
3570), with the treatment accorded William Kunstler, Barry Nakell and William
Pitts in In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990) (Chapman, Wilkinson and
Wilkins, JJ.), petitions for cert. filed., 59 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1990) (No.
90-802) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3465), 59 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov. 19,
1990) (No. 90-807) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3466), 59 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S.
Jan. 8, 1991) (No. 90-1094) (summarized at 59 U.S.L.W. 3566).
In addition to differences in judicial perspectives on the Rule's application,
significant differences among litigators in their views of the risks and benefits of
seeking sanctions contribute to variations in the Rule's invocation and
application.
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ing en banc. 7 5
Similar uncertainty and inconsistency exist at the district
court level. 76 A substantial amount of the apparently enhanced
judicial enforcement has been in those large urban districts that
have experienced much of the Rule activity to date. 77 Even in
Moreover,
those districts, however, uncertainty exists. 78
favorable rulings by a few judges in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania or the Southern District of New York 7 9 mean little to litigants outside those districts or within the districts but before a
different judge.8 0 Too few courts have actually implemented the
75. For example, in Kunstler the Fourth Circuit took just nine days before
unanimously rejecting the petition for rehearing en banc. Telephone interview
with Professor Barry Nakell, University of North Carolina School of Law (Oct.
30, 1990) (attorney for plaintiff in Kunstler). See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v.
Burroughs Corp., 809 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1987) (five judges dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); McFeeley, En Banc Proceedings in the United States Courts
of Appeals, 24 IDAHO L. REV. 255 (1987-88) (statistics show little chance of en
banc disposition). See generally Bartlett ex rel. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240,
1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("It is an enormous distraction to break into [the court's]
schedule and tie up the entire court to hear one case en banc.") (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 940 (1988).
Several circuits have issued en banc determinations to clarify sanctions decisionmaking within their jurisdictions. See, e.g., Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental
Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1989) ("We heard this case en banc to
achieve harmony."); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 868 (5th
Cir. 1988) ("In view of the high import of Rule 11 to both the bench and the bar,
this Court took the instant case en banc to resolve any inconsistencies ... in this
Circuit."); Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11 th Cir. 1987) ("This
court took this case en banc to consider procedures and standards for the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11.").
76. For a discussion of Rule 11 developments in the district courts, see
supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
77. See Vairo, supra note 4, at 200 (almost one-third of reported cases arose
out of districts covering New York City and Chicago). The Northern District of
California, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Southern District of
Florida also have experienced considerable Rule 11 activity.
78. For example, there are very few opinions solicitous of civil rights plaintiffs issued by judges in the Northern District of California or the Southern District of Florida, both districts with considerable Rule 11 activity. But see United
States v. City and County of San Francisco, 132 F.R.D. 533, 537 (N.D. Cal.
1990).
79. For examples of rulings from these districts, see supra notes 47-48 and
accompanying text.
80. For instance, recent enforcement of the Rule by certain judges in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania has been solicitous of civil rights plaintiffs and
attorneys. See, e.g., Costello v. Daddario, 710 F. Supp. 1035, 1037-38 (E.D. Pa.
1989) (Pollak,J.) (discussed supra note 48 and accompanying text); Smith v. Philadelphia School Dist., 679 F. Supp. 479, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (VanArtsdalen,J.)
(where learning impaired student sued for failure to provide individualized education, court found plaintiff's theory untenable but did "not regard the mere
filing ... on this untenable theory to be so completely lacking in merit ... or in
factual or legal support as to impose sanctions"); see also Doering v. Union
County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 195-97 (3d Cir. 1988) (by
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recent improvements in meaningful ways.
Other developments in related areas may exacerbate the effect of imposing Rule 11 sanctions on civil rights plaintiffs and
their counsel. Quite important is the Supreme Court's recent articulation of a deferential standard for appellate review of district
court application of the Rule. 8 1 The Court also has read Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 68 and 23(e) in conjunction with the
Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act8 2 in ways that could further deplete the already small pool of lawyers who have the
wherewithal to assume the mounting risks of representing dis83
crimination victims.
III.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Analysis of Rule 11 activity indicates that judicial implemenimplication, courts may consider non-monetary sanctions); S. BURBANK, supra
note 5, at 37 (Third Circuit has repeatedly emphasized availability of non-monetary sanctions). Despite these developments, the Third Circuit Task Force was
"surprised" to find that the "sanctions imposed in reported cases are usually
monetary, and usually require payment to another party." Id. at 36; see supra
note 7 and accompanying text (discussing Task Force and its findings).
Inconsistent enforcement by different courts may be explained by the difficulty of applying the reasoning of the recent opinions which include suggestions
for enforcement. The best example of this phenomenon is the difficulty courts
have in according proper emphasis to the reasonableness of prefiling inquiries
rather than to the papers' quality or the merits. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text; see also Tobias, supra note 1, at 510-17 (problems of clarity, translation and transferability).
81. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990).
The Court held that the courts of appeals should apply an abuse of discretion
standard to all aspects of district court Rule 11 determinations. Cf.Crabtree v.
Muchmore, 904 F.2d 1475, 1479 (10th Cir. 1990) (district court abused its discretion in not awarding attorneys' fees under the Rule to defendants in civil
rights case). The Court also resolved a conflict among the courts of appeals by
holding that district courts could not award costs of appeals under the Rule.
Cooler, 110 S. Ct. at 24 (determination is for courts of appeals under FED. R. App.

P. 38).
82. Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90
Stat. 2641 (1976), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). For a discussion of litigation financing and the problems posed by these interpretations of the Fees Act
and Rules 23(e) and 68, see Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 310-19 (1989).
83. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (Rule 23(e) requires judicial
approval of class action settlements, and district courts may approve settlements
waiying attorneys' fees otherwise available under § 1988); Marek v. Chesny, 473
U.S.1 (1985) (Rule 68 provides that if final judgment is not more favorable than
pretrial settlement offer, offeree must assume own post-offer costs, which include § 1988 attorneys' fees); cf.Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 660
(4th Cir. 1990) (Title VII case in which defendant "instituted an extensive company-wide anti-sexual harassment policy . . .at least partially in response to"
plaintiff's suit but plaintiff recovered only $1 in nominal damages, under Marek
plaintiff had to assume $330,000 in post-offer fees incurred).
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tation in civil rights cases has improved since the beginning of
1989. During 1990, relatively few reported opinions seriously
disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs or practitioners. The substantial qualifications described above, however, prevent the conclusion that no additional change in the Rule is needed. What
federal judges and those institutions possessing authority to alter
the rules should do, however, remains quite controversial.
A.

Possible Amendment

The Supreme Court, the Advisory Committee on the Civil
Rules and Congress should promptly revise the Rule in ways that
are responsive to civil rights plaintiffs and their counsel. The entities with rule-amending responsibilities should remember that a
number of the Rule's primary objectives, namely prompting lawyers to "stop and think" before filing papers and reducing abuse
84
of the litigation process, have been substantially accomplished.
These purposes and additional goals that have not been achieved
fully can be attained nearly as effectively with other measures,
such as judicial case management.8 5 The essential role that civil
rights litigation plays in reducing discrimination in the United
States makes the risks of not amending the Rule too substantial.
Courts, commentators and critics have offered a multitude of
cogent suggestions for change that need not be comprehensively
recounted here. One example is Professor Nelken's proposal for
modifications that would emphasize the sufficiency of prefiling inquiries and limit the importance of attorneys' fees as an appropriate sanction. 8 6 This suggestion was primarily intended to reduce
the Rule's chilling effects, especially in civil rights actions. Other
recommendations have included reinstituting the Rule's pre-1983
formulation or awarding attorneys' fees only upon a showing that
violators have abused the civil litigation process or acted in bad
88
faith.8 7 Some critics have even championed Rule lI's repeal.
That prospect still warrants serious consideration, although it
84. See, e.g., T. WILLGING, supra note 73, at 11-12; Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1014-15 (1988).
85. See, e.g., SANCTIONS, supra note 11, at 16, 24-25; Vairo, supra note 4, at
233.
86. Professor Nelken proposed changes both in the Rule's text and in its
accompanying advisory committee note. See Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Lookingfor a Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J.
383, 385, 405-08 (1990).
87. See, e.g., SANCTIONS, supra note 11, at 2-3, 24-25; see also Tobias, supra
note 1, at 524; Vairo, supra note 4, at 233; infra note 90.
88. See, e.g., LaFrance, supra note 8, at 352-58; Tobias, supra note 1, at 524.
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may be too draconian for some, including numerous individuals
who are responsible for possible amendment. 89
B. Additional Study Is Unnecessary
Additional analysis should not be a prerequisite to informed
amendment. Those with rule-revising power presently have sufficient information on which to base rational determinations regarding the Rule's possible amendment. Nevertheless, in
February 1990, Judge Grady, then Chair of the Advisory Committee, denominated numerous areas that he considered appropriate
for future study. 90 The Advisory Committee announced in August 1990 that it was undertaking a study of the Rule that may
lead to proposals for change in April 1991.91 The American Judicature Society also recently commenced an assessment of activity
89. Those responsible for amendment simply seem unamenable to such a
substantial change, especially in light of the rather widespread belief, particularly in the federal judiciary, that much litigation abuse remains to be deterred
and that the Rule is a valuable tool for doing so. See infra notes 90-91, 102 and
accompanying text.
90. See Letter from Judge John Grady to Representative Robert Kastenmeier (Feb. 9, 1990) [hereinafter Letter] (on file with author). Representative Kastenmeier was the Chair of the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual
Property and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee.
Judge Grady also asserted that the 1983 "amendments were, after all, addressed
to what was perceived to be a serious problem of litigation abuse."
91. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Related Rules, 131 F.R.D. 335 (1990) [hereinafter Call
for Comments]. The Committee requested that the bench, the bar and the public
submit written comments on the Rule's operation by November 1, stated that it
would hold a public hearing to receive oral testimony in February, 1991, and
suggested that it might propose changes in the Rule at the Committee's regularly scheduled meeting in April 1991. It also commissioned an Empirical study
of Rule 11 by the Federal Judicial Center. See id. at 345.
The prospect of actual revision remains too nascent to warrant substantial
treatment in this article. The Committee's indication of interest is only the first
step in what could be a lengthy revision process. See generally Lewis, The Excessive
History of FederalRule 15(c) and Its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 MIcH. L. REV.
1507 (1987) (comprehensive analysis of inefficiencies in process of rules revision). The mere indication of interest does not mean that the Rule actually will
be amended. The Committee has already indicated that it may choose not to
proceed beyond the hearing stage. See Callfor Comments, supra, at 345.
Even if the process continues beyond the hearing stage, problems will remain. If the adverse effects on civil rights enforcement result from the Rule as
applied, not as written, only significant revisions are likely to confer much benefit. The Committee is unlikely to suggest substantial rewriting or changes that
would significantly help civil rights plaintiffs. Finally, whatever amendment the
Committee suggests probably would not become effective for several years. All
of these considerations warrant minimal treatment in this article of the Committee's expression of interest and an emphasis on judicial application.
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under the Rule in the Second, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits. 9 2
Conditioning amendment of the Rule on completion of these
studies is unnecessary. There presently exists a base of information considerably larger and more sophisticated than the one on
which the rule-amending authorities premised the 1983 revision. 93 Studies have already established that sanctions have been
sought from, and imposed upon, civil rights plaintiffs at high
rates. 94 Accumulating anecdotal evidence on informal activity
under the Rule complements these findings. 9 5 Moreover, additional studies will not completely overcome the principal difficulty
with previous studies-the general unavailability of information
on much Rule 11 activity, particularly that which is informal. The
data that are likely to be the most informative are also the hardest
to secure, document and synthesize in ways that generate sup96
portable conclusions.
If the Advisory Committee determines that additional study
is necessary, it should capitalize on prior work. Further inquiry
will consume money and time. The cost of the information, especially when there is concern over federal spending, may be
prohibitively high. Moreover, while the studies proceed, disadvantageous judicial application of the Rule will continue to impose significant costs on civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys who
cannot afford the expense. Therefore, future study should build
on what has come before. The Third Circuit Task Force has provided numerous valuable ideas about precisely what constitutes
civil rights litigation, which Rule 11 activity should be analyzed,
and how evaluations ought to be performed. 97 A 1988 report by
92. See American Judicature Society Rule I I Project (1990) (copy on file
with author).
93. See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1927-28; Letter, supra note 18, at 3. Certain ironies are implicated here. For instance, proponents of the 1983 amendment, which was based substantially on anecdotal information, now seem to be

demanding that critics who seek to change it not be permitted to rely on such
information but be required to make very substantial showings. See Letter, supra
note 90, at 1-2; see also Miller, The New Certification Standard Under Rule 11, 130

F.R.D. 479, 505-06 (1990).
94. See, e.g., supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
96. For example, few district judges will admit that they threatened to sanction civil rights lawyers who refused to withdraw certain substantive claims. See
supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. Correspondingly, a civil rights attorney might believe that a court was threatening to impose a sanction, although
the judge actually intended to issue a warning in an attempt to minimize sanctions should they be levied. It is difficult to distinguish improper threats from
appropriate or even beneficial warnings. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 502 n.60.
97. See S. BURBANK, supra note 5, at 4-6, 44-45, 68-72, 96-99.
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the Federal Judicial Center has been another helpful source of
suggestions, particularly for securing geographically diverse data
and detecting potential chilling. 98
C. JudicialApplication
Barring dramatic change, such as the highly improbable
prospect of congressional legislation exempting civil rights litigation from Rule 11 sanctions, 99 the manner in which the Rule is
applied will remain important to effective enforcement of civil
rights in this country. Federal judges should seriously consider
curtailed enforcement of the Rule evident in some jurisdictions.' 0 0 The courts might follow the suggestions of certain
Third Circuit judges that the Rule's application be restricted to
exceptional situations, such as those involving misuse of the litigation process.101
Courts that wish to continue enforcing the Rule broadly, out
of a belief that abuse of the process of civil litigation remains
widespread, 0 2 should keep in mind when resolving sanctions motions the factors discussed throughout this paper, particularly
civil rights plaintiffs' dearth of resources and vulnerability to chilling. Central to judicial analysis should be the reasonableness of
prefiling inquiries; courts should remember that civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys typically have limited time and money for performing their investigations. 0 3 If a court finds that a litigant or
lawyer has contravened the Rule, it should take into account the
violator's ability to pay and carefully consider the possibility of
levying non-monetary sanctions. The imposition of attorneys'
10 4
fees should be the "sanction of last resort."'
98. See T. WILLGING, supra note 73, at 8-10, 15-19, 160-63, 168, 179-89; cf
Tobias, supra note 4, at 176-79 (additional suggestions).
99. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. Congress's recent failure
to override President Bush's veto of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 makes the prospect of enacting an exemption unlikely. See President's Veto of Rights Measure Survives by One Vote, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25. 1990, at Al, col. 3; see also New Battle
Looming as Democrats Reintroduce Civil Rights Measure, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1991, at
A12, col. 1 (House Democrats reintroduced civil rights bill significantly tougher
than one President vetoed).
100. See Tobias, supra note 1,at 513-17.
101. See, e.g., Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857
F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988); Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483-85 (3d
Cir. 1987).
102. See Schwarzer, supra note 84; Tobias, supra note 4, at 180-81.
103. See supra notes 1, 34 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Morrison v. Lipscomb, 877 F.2d 463, 469 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1232 (6th Cir. 1986)); Doering,
857 F.2d at 194-97.
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IV.

127

CONCLUSION

Federal judicial enforcement of Rule 11 has adversely affected civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers since the Rule was
amended in August 1983. Numerous courts recently have enhanced the quality of their formal decisionmaking under the revised provision, and judges should similarly apply the
amendment in the future. It remains impossible to ascertain,
however, whether the apparent improvements will suffice for civil
rights plaintiffs and practitioners, principally because the enforcement most detrimental to them has been informal. Because civil
rights litigation plays a significant role in American society, the
Supreme Court, the Advisory Committee and Congress should
expeditiously revise the Rule. Until they do, courts should apply
the amendment in ways that are solicitous of the needs of civil
rights plaintiffs and attorneys.
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